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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jason A. Hotchkiss appeals from the district court's order revoking his probation 
and executing, without reduction, the underlying consecutive unified sentences of ten 
years, with four years fixed, and ten years, with five years fixed. On appeal, 
Mr. Hotchkiss asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court has denied him due process of law 
and equal protection by refusing to augment the record on appeal with transcripts of his 
change of plea, sentencing, and rider review hearings. He further asserts that the 
district court abused its discretion when, in light of the mitigating circumstances known 
to it, it revoked his probation and executed the underlying sentence without reduction. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
This case began when Mr. Hotchkiss was charged by Information with five 
counts of grand theft. (R., pp.16-18.) A plea agreement was reached between the 
parties. The terms of the agreement were as follows: 
[T]he defendant wi" be pleading guilty to Count I and Count V but the 
defendant wi" pay restitution on a" 5 counts. The defendant wi" have a 
substance abuse evaluation and PSI done before sentencing. The 
defendant wi" testify at any trial of co-defendants. The fines and fees wi" 
be left in the Court's discretion, plus standard court costs and public 
defender reimbursement. The defendant will be incarcerated for a period 
of 14 years with 4 years fixed and 10 years indeterminate. The State will 
not request imposition but will cap as retained jurisdiction. That sentence 
is to run concurrent with each case. When the defendant enters his plea 
the State wi" stipulate that the defendant's bond will be reduced to 
$2,500.00. 
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(R., p.20.1) Pursuant to that agreement, Mr. Hotchkiss "entered a plea [sic] of 
'GUILTY.'" (R., p.21.2) Following his guilty pleas, Mr. Hotchkiss failed to appear at 
sentencing, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. (R., p.30.) At a later hearing, the 
State announced that it was "no longer bound to the recommendations." (R., p.35.) 
At the sentencing hearing, both defense counsel and Mr. Hotchkiss provided 
corrections to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI). (R., pp.37-38.) 
At sentencing, the State requested concurrent unified sentences of fourteen years, with 
four years fixed. (R., p.38.) Defense counsel requested "[t]hat the defendant be sent 
on a rider." Mr. Hotchkiss then made a statement, the substance of which is unknown.3 
(R., p.38.) Ultimately, the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with 
four years fixed, on count I, and a consecutive unified sentence of ten years, with five 
years fixed. The district court retained jurisdiction. (R., p.38.) Following Mr. Hotchkiss' 
rider, the district court suspended both sentences, and placed Mr. Hotchkiss on 
probation for a period of ten years. (R., pp.65-72.) 
Just over two years after he was placed on probation, Mr. Hotchkiss was 
accused of violating six conditions of his probation. (R., pp.74-78.) Without any 
agreement as to disposition, Mr. Hotchkiss agreed to admit to four of the six violations, 
in exchange for the State dismissing the two remaining alleged violations. (Tr.1 0/18/11, 
p.5, Ls.15-22.) Pursuant to that agreement, Mr. Hotchkiss admitted to violating his 
probation by: (1) committing the crime of driving without privileges; (2) failing to attend 
the work readiness class after being terminated from his job; (3) failing to report and 
1 Mr. Hotchkiss cites to the Court Minutes because his request for transcripts from the 
guilty plea, sentencing, and rider review hearings was denied by the Idaho Supreme 
Court following the State's objection. (Order (August 28,2012).) 
2 See note 1, supra. 
3 See note 1, supra. 
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provide truthful and accurate information to the probation department; and (4) failing to 
pay restitution. (Tr.1 0/18/11, p.8, L.2 - p.9, L.10.) 
At the disposition hearing, the State requested that the sentences be executed. 
(Tr.12/19/11, p.8, L.22 - p.10, L.8.) Defense counsel asked that probation be 
reinstated, or alternatively, that the district court retain jurisdiction again. (Tr.12/19/11, 
p.10, L.10 - p.12, L.13.) Ultimately, the district court revoked probation and executed 
the underlying sentences without reduction. (Tr.12/19/11, p.i?, Ls.14-1?) 
Mr. Hotchkiss filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's order revoking 
probation. (R., p.153.) 
On appeal, Mr. Hotchkiss filed a motion to augment the appellate record 
requesting the preparation of four additional transcripts, specifically those involving the 
change of plea hearing, the original sentencing hearing, the rider review hearing, and 
the evidentiary hearing on the probation violations for which his probation was revoked. 
(Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support 
Thereof.) The State filed a partial objection to the Motion, agreeing that it was 
appropriate to augment with a transcript of the evidentiary hearing, but objecting to the 
other requested transcripts. (Objection in part to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend 
the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof.") The Idaho Supreme Court 
then issued an Order granting the Motion only as to the transcript of the evidentiary 
hearing, and denying it as to the other requested transcripts. (Order (August 28,2012).) 
Mr. Hotchkiss then filed a renewed motion with respect to the transcript from his original 
sentencing hearing. (Renewed Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof.) The State objected to this Motion 
(Objection to "Renewed Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and 
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Statement in Support Thereof"), and the Idaho Supreme Court denied it. (Order 
(November 9, 2012).) 
4 
ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Hotchkiss due process and equal 
protection when it denied his motion to augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Hotchkiss' probation 




The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Hotchkiss Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent 
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the 
defendant intends to raise on appeal. The only way a court can constitutionally 
preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove 
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal. 
In this case, Mr. Hotchkiss filed a Motion to Augment, requesting various 
transcripts and arguing that, when determining whether to revoke probation, a district 
court can consider all of the hearings before and after sentencing. On appeal, 
Mr. Hotchkiss challenges the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the 
transcripts. Mr. Hotchkiss asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the 
district court's asserted failure to reduce his sentence upon revoking probation because 
that decision was made after the original sentencing hearing, and the district court could 
have, therefore, relied on its memory of the hearings in question when it decided to 
revoke probation and execute the underlying sentence. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme 
Court erred in denying Mr. Hotchkiss' request.4 
4 The arguments set forth herein were recently rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
See State v. Morgan, _ Idaho _ (Ct. App. July 10, 2012), rev. pending. Because the 
Idaho Supreme Court has yet to rule on the arguments, Mr. Hotchkiss maintains that the 
Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in Morgan was wrongly decided. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Hotchkiss Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The 
Requested Transcripts 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Hotchkiss With 
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit-Based Appellate Review Of His 
Claims 
The Constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 10. CONST. art. 
I § 13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981 ). 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additiona"y, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United 
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 
132 Idaho 221,227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is statutory. See I.C. § 19-2801. 
Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, such transcript 
must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court 
rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates the production of 
transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.C.R. 5.2(a). Further, 
"[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .... " Id. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to be 
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prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as 
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a). 
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases. 
The first is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses 
are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants and 
those with financial means is not tolerated. The second limits the states' obligation to 
provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do not have to provide 
indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet the constitutional 
mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must provide indigent 
defendants with appellate records unless some or all of the requested materials are 
unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that time, the 
State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been 
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase 
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transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme 
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty 
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court affirmed its holding in 
Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court be 
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accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigence. In that 
case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of his 
conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to 
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access 
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less 
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase 
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of 
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure for determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. 
"Under the present standard ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions 
of error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute 
their appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its 
statement in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent 
alternative is available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all 
of the stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of 
the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for 
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court u!timately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be 
adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
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Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument that 
he needs the requested items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the 
State opposes the defendant's requests, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. This authority has been 
recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals. See 
Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 
2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 2007). 
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation 
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963). In that case, a transcript was 
necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the 
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must provide an 
adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed. "It is well established that an 
appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate 
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of 
the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial 
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999). If the transcripts are missing, 
but the record contains court minutes, they may be sufficient so that a meaningful 
review is possible, although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that 
appellate counsel not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for 
this Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489,491 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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In this case, Mr. Hotchkiss presents on appeal the question of whether the district 
court erred by revoking his probation and by failing to sua sponte reduce his sentences 
when it revoked his probation. The transcript of the February 4, 2008, change of plea 
hearing is necessary because, at the hearing, the minutes reflect that Mr. Hotchkiss was 
"sworn and examined as a witness in [his] own behalf and for information of the Court," 
which was followed by Mr. Hotchkiss' entry of guilty pleas. (R, pp.20-21.) It is not 
possible to tell what level of responsibility Mr. Hotchkiss took when he pled guilty, nor is 
it possible to know what "information" was provided to the district court during the 
change of plea hearing because this Court denied his motion to augment with a copy of 
the transcript. (Order (August 28, 2012).) Additionally, a transcript of the November 3, 
2008, sentencing hearing is necessary because it included corrections to the PSI, as 
well as a "[sJtatement made by the defendant," the contents of which are unknown 
because this Court denied his motion to augment with a copy of the transcript. 
(R, pp.37-38; Order (August 28, 2012); Order (November 9, 2012).) Finally, the 
transcript of the June 1, 2009, rider review hearing is necessary on appeal because that 
hearing included the presentation of information concerning programs completed after 
the Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSI) was 
prepared, as well as a "[s]tatement by the defendant," the contents of which are 
unknown because this Court denied his motion to augment with a copy of the transcript. 
(R, pp.58-59; Order (August 28, 2012).) If Mr. Hotchkiss fails to provide the appellate 
court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply and Mr. Hotchkiss' 
claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action alone which 
prevents his access to the requested items, then such action is a violation of due 
process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer apply. 
12 
All three of the requested transcripts are within the scope of appellate review. 
The transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all proceedings 
following sentencing when determining whether the court appropriately revoked 
probation. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26,28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a 
sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine 
the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base 
our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events 
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation.") (emphasis 
added). Furthermore, as the Supreme Court explained in State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 
149 (1986), 
[I]n the process of determining whether an individual's probation should be 
revoked, the trial court "necessarily must be permitted to evaluate a broad 
range of information about the defendant[ ] .. " Very little information 
about a defendant will be irrelevant to the effort of the law to individualize 
treatment of convicted persons." 
Chapman, 111 Idaho at 153 (quoting State v. Moore, 93 Idaho 14, 17 (1969)) (bracket 
and emphases in original). Additionally, failure to include a transcript on appeal results 
in the application of a presumption that the missing transcript supports the actions of the 
district court. See State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Burdett has 
failed to include the transcript from his change of plea hearing wherein, according to the 
district court minutes, he was examined by the court regarding his guilty plea. Portions 
of a transcript missing on appeal are presumed to support the actions of the district 
court."). 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of 
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Hotchkiss' Motion to Augment will 
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render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts 
support the district court's order revoking probation. This functions as a procedural bar 
to the review of Mr. Hotchkiss' appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore, 
Mr. Hotchkiss should either be provided with the requested transcripts, or the 
presumption should not be applied. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Hotchkiss With 
Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated against the states 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, the United 
States Supreme Court reasoned that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably 
related to due process that the denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a 
hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 64. The Supreme Court also stated that, under the facts 
of Powell "the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure to make 
an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... [and that to] hold otherwise would be to 
ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 'that there are certain immutable 
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member 
of the Union may disregard.'" Id. at 65 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898)). 
In Doug/as v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny in determining that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants with 
counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of Douglas 
14 
was extended to include the right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel. 
According to the United States Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Doug/as that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trialCwould be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
According to the United States Supreme Court, to be constitutionally effective 
appellate counsel must make a conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in 
support of the best arguments to be made. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 
(1967). In Anders, the Court held that the constitutional requirements of sUbstantial 
equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an active 
advocate on behalf of his client .... [counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." /d.; see also Banuelos v. State, 
127 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination 
of the case, and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether 
there is factual support for the arguments made. Therefore, Mr. Hotchkiss has not 
obtained a full review of the court proceedings based on the merits and cannot receive 
the effective assistance of counsel that is guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
the starting point of evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel 
in a criminal action is the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION. These standards offer further insight into the role and 
responsibilities of defense counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
15 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . .. Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-S.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
decision to revoke probation. Further, appel/ate counsel is unable to advise 
Mr. Hotchkiss on the probable role the transcripts may play in this appeal. 
Mr. Hotchkiss is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the requested 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Hotchkiss his 
constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of 
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access 
to the requested transcripts, and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any 
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Hotchkiss's Probation 
And Executed His Underlying, Consecutive Sentences Of Ten Years, With Four Years 
Fixed, And Ten Years, With Five Years Fixed 
Mr. Hotchkiss asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked 
his probation and executed his underlying, consecutive sentences of ten years, with four 
years fixed, and ten years, with five years fixed, without any reduction. The standards 
of appellate review for such claims on appeal were set forth in the Idaho Court of 
Appeals' opinion in State v. Hoskins: 
16 
When a trial court revokes a defendant's probation, the court possesses 
authority under I.C.R. 35 to sua sponte reduce the sentence. The 
decision whether to do so is committed to the discretion of the court. Rule 
35 also allows the defendant to file a motion for reduction of a sentence 
within fourteen days after issuance of an order revoking probation, and 
Hoskins filed such a motion here. A motion for a sentence reduction 
under this rule is essentially a request for leniency which is addressed to 
the sound discretion of the sentencing court. On appeal, our criteria for 
review of rulings on Rule 35 motions are the same as those applied in 
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable. The 
defendant bears the burden of showing that the sentence is unreasonably 
harsh in light of the primary objective of protecting society and the related 
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. Our focus on review is 
upon the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. When 
we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of 
probation, we do not base our review upon only the facts existing when 
the sentence was imposed. Rather, we examine all the circumstances 
bearing upon the decision to revoke probation and require execution of the 
sentence, including events that occurred between the original 
pronouncement of the sentence and the revocation of probation. 
State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 672 (Ct. App. 1998) (internal citations omitted). 
During his allocution at the probation disposition hearing, Mr. Hotchkiss provided 
a substantial amount of information in mitigation, telling the district court, 
I never missed any monthly appointments. I never missed any drug tests, 
any hair follicles, never had any dirty UAs. 
I did all my classes. I paid for them on my own, plus paying my bills. 
You know, I was - I was working hard. I was putting in over 280 hours a 
month, you know, working six days a week, pius doing my classes four 
days a week. I was forking out over $400 a week just in classes and 
urinalyses. I take [sic] three - three UAs a week for the first year and a 
half I was out. 
I got fired from my job at Stanley Hay. It was more of a personal vendetta 
than, you know, I should have gotten fired. I should have gotten 
disciplinary and gotten three days off. And, you know, it wasn't really my 
fault. It turned out to be a mechanical fault. I pulled the E-brake too hard 
and it came disconnected, and that's why the forklift rolled off the back -
the dump truck. But, you know, the old me, after I got fired, because I was 
pretty tore [sic] up after that, the old me would have went [sic] back to the 
old, you know, stealing, getting money. I would have went [sic] back, you 
know, using drugs, alcohol, any excuse to, you know, to get away, and I 
never gave up. I went out. I signed up [with] all the temp services. I got 
college here and there. I had job interviews. I had multiple job interviews 
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but a lot of them, you know, I was - when it says, "Are you a felon?" I 
always put - I would explain upon interview. And when I'm interviewed 
they asked what my felony is, and I told them grand theft, and most of 
them tell me that they can't hire me because their insurance won't cover 
me. So I've been turned down a lot just because of my - my past, my 
crime, what I'm on probation for. But I never gave up. I still tried. Went to 
the library every day. I live right by the library. I get free internet access 
to go there. Get on the internet, fill out job applications that way. 
My ex-girlfriend didn't want me to get into any more trouble, so she bought 
me a mountain bike. I have a mountain bike now. 
I was supposed to start at Jayco Trailer July 7th, which I got picked up on 
July 6th, and my probation officer knew that. I had the job verification form 
already filled out. I handed it to her. I'm hoping to follow up on that when I 
get - upon my release. And if, you know, they say no, then 1'/1 just sign up 
for a/l the temp services again, and get hustling on trying to find a job. 
And I just want one more chance. You know, like I said, I was working 
really hard out there. I was really trying. You know, I'm not perfect. I'm 
far from perfect, but I really am trying, and I hope that you reinstate me on 
probation. 
(Tr.12/19/11, p.12, L.19 - p.15, L.3.) 
Mr. Hotchkiss first accepted responsibility when he admitted to investigating 
officers that he had committed three of the crimes charged. (Supplemental Incident 
Report, dated 11/16/2007 (appended to 3/12/08 PSI), p.1 (admitting to crimes against 
two of the victims); Supplemental Incident Report, dated 10/4/2007 (appended to 
3/12/08 PSI) (admitting to crime against a third victim).) He again accepted 
responsibility when he pled guilty, and again when he admitted to violating his 
probation. He further accepted responsibility when, at his allocution on the probation 
violations, he told the district court, "Your Honor, I don't want to sit here and justify my 
QUI position, in driving in the first place, no matter what the circumstance was." 
(Tr.12/19/11, p.12, Ls.15-18.) He expressed remorse and regret for these offenses 
(and uncharged misconduct of which his father was a victim) when he stated, "I hate 
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myself for what I did. But I have to learn to forgive myself and move forward in my life, 
so have my parents." (PSI (12/13/11), p.5.) 
The crimes for which Mr. Hotchkiss pled guilty were the direct result of his 
relapse with methamphetamine, which followed three years of sobriety. Following his 
relapse, he quit his job and "went down hill [sic] fast." According to Mr. Hotchkiss, his 
crimes occurred as follows: 
One night I was out walking my dog and I went to check my mail and 
someone elses [sic] mail box was open. So I pulled out their mail and 
went through it and found some blank check's [sic] in there so over the 
next week I tryed [sic] to cash them. I was onle [sic] able to cash a 
couple. If I had been sobber [sic] I probably wouldn't even [have] had the 
thought about doing that. 
(PSI (3/12/08), p.2.) Mr. Hotchkiss acknowledged his methamphetamine addiction, and 
expressed a desire for treatment. (PSI (3/12/08), p.15.) 
While Mr. Hotchkiss was on probation, he completed Early Recovery and 
Relapse Prevention. In explaining his plan for continuing to remain sober, he wrote, "I 
went on a reyder [sic] and learned alot [sic] about myself and have aplied [sic] those 
tools to staying sober today. I just don't want that life any more [sic]. I love being sober 
now. It's a great life." (PSI (12/13/11), p.8.) Furthermore, while on probation, 
Mr. Hotchkiss was not accused of committing any new felony offenses. (PSI (12/13/11), 
p.10.) 
In light of the mitigating circumstances, including his continued sobriety, 
acceptance of responsibility, and the fact that he committed no new felonies while on 
probation, Mr. Hotchkiss asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it 




Hotchkiss respectfully requests that this Court order that he be placed on 
probation in this case. In the alternative, he requests that this Court order that his 
consecutive sentences run concurrently, otherwise reduce his underlying sentences as 
it deems appropriate, or remand this matter to the district court for a new probation 
disposition hearing. 
DATED this 16th day of November, 2012. 
~,SPENpER J. HAHN 
lJept1(y State Appellate Public Defender 
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